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1 Introduction 
This paper presents a collection of results on the modelling of social phenomena, such 
as economic dynamics, tax evasion, diffusion of criminality. A large part of the more 
recent results that we will describe were obtained by our research group (Iacopo Borsi, 
Giorgio Busoni, Antonio Fasano, Alberto Mancini, Luca Meacci, Mario Primicerio) 
with the collaboration of Miguel A. Herrero and Juan Carlos Nuno of the Univeristy 
Complutense in Madrid, and involving some of our students as well. See [8, 9, 10, 19, 
20, 21, 22]. 
2  Economic dynamics: compartmental models 
The simplest mathematical framework that we can use to describe the evolution of the 
distribution of wealth in a society is based on a compartmental model. We consider a 
closed population composed of N  individuals and we identify n  sub-populations 
(classes)   of increasing wealth. If we denote by  the number of 
individuals that, at time t , are in the class   we have 
1 2, , , nU U U? ( )iu t
iU
1 2( ) ( ) ( )nu t u t u t N+ + + =?      (1) 
Next, we assume that the rate of transition from any class k to the adjacent classes is 
linear and governed by suitable non-negative coefficients of “social promotion”   kα
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and of \social relegation" k, while the transition to a social class not adjacent
is forbidden.1
Therefore, we will have the following system of ordinary dierential equa-
tions:
_uk(t) = k 1uk(t)  (k + k)uk(t) + k+1uk+1(t); k = 1; 2; : : : ; n (2)
where 0 = n+1 = 1 = n = 0. It is obvious that if k and k are constant
for any k, the stationary solution2 has to satisfy
u^k =
1
2
2
3
: : :
k 1
k
u^1  k 1u^1; k = 2; ::; n (3)
and hence is uniquely determined if we impose the condition (1),
u^1 =
N
(1 +
Pn
k=2 k 1)
; (4)
Now, if we dene 0 = 1 we can write
u^k =
Nk 1Pn
j=1 k 1
 !kN (5)
In practice, mobility coecients are not constant but depend on the social
dynamics itself. For instance in [16] the case is considered when they depend
on the dimension N of the population, assuming that each class has a specic
demographic behaviour. But even in the case of isolated population an inter-
esting situation arises when k and k are assumed to depend on the total
wealth of the population. The latter can be expressed as
W (t) =
nX
k=1
pkuk(t); (0  p1  p2  :::  pn) (6)
where pk is the contribution that each individual in Uk gives to the common
richness.
A more sophisticated model, instead of (6) could take into account the
budgetary policy of the government in the form of another ordinary dierential
equation
_W (t) =
nX
k=1
pkuk(t) 	(W (t); t) ; (7)
1Of course, this assumption could be released and coecients ki (k < i) and ki (k > i)
could be introduced. We chose the approach above to give a simpler and more evident picture.
2Note that (1) excludes the trivial solution of (2), sine N > 0.
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where, in this case, pk is the amount of taxes paid by the individual in class
Uk and 	 is the rate of expenditure of the community.
To characterize the possible stationary solutions of (2), (6), one can use
(5) and say that the system admits as many stationary solutions as the xed
points of the transformation
W = N
nX
k=1
pk!k(W ): (8)
To be specic, consider the toy model with n = 2
_u1 = u2   u1; _u2 = u1   u2; W = p1u1 + p2u2: (9)
Normalizing and setting
x = u1=N; y = y2=N; R =W=p2N; (10)
we have that the stationary wealth R^ has to satisfy
R^ =
+ 
+ 
; with  = p1=p2; 0 <  < 1: (11)
The r.h.s. is a given function of R^ so that (11) can be written as
R^ = (R^); (12)
where  is continuous and 0 <  < 1, so that (12) has at least one solution in
(0; 1). It turns out that this is unique if 0 < 1. It can be easily checked that
it is globally asymptotically stable.
3 Economic dynamics: continuous models
3.1 The balance equation
A generalization of the model described in the previous section consists in
assuming that each individual at a given time t has a wealth index x (where
x is any real non-negative number in a given interval that can represent the
salary, the amount of income tax, etc.: we will normalize x and assume that it
can take any values in [0; 1]). We will describe the wealth distribution in the
society by an L1 function n(x; t) such that the integralZ x2
x1
n(x; t)dx; 0  x1 < x2  1;
28 Vietnam Journal of Mathematical Applications, Vol. 12, N. 2, 2014
represents the number of individuals that, at time t, have wealth index between
x1 and x2.
The mobility in the society is represented by a function (x; y) such thatZ t2
t1
dt
Z 1
0
dy
Z x2
x1
n(x; t)(x; y)dx;
represents the number of individuals that, in the time interval (t1; t2), leave the
class with wealth index belonging to the interval (x1; x2). Similarly, a numberZ t2
t1
dt
Z 1
0
dx
Z x2
x1
n(x; t)(x; y)dy;
enters the class (x1; x2) in the time interval (t1; t2).
The balance equation takes the form
@n(x; t)
@t
=  n(x; t)
Z 1
0
(x; y)dy +
Z 1
0
n(y; t)(y; x)dy; (13)
that has to be solved with a prescribed initial condition
n(x; 0) = n0(x): (14)
It can be proved [9] that if n0 2 L1(0; 1), n0  0 and  2 L1(0; 1)2,   0,
then (13), (14) has a unique solution that is non-negative, belongs to L1(0; 1)
for any positive t and is continuously dierentiable w.r.t. t. Moreover,Z 1
0
n(x; t)dx =
Z 1
0
n0(x)dx = N: (15)
Among the regularity properties that can be proved (see [10]), we quote the
fact that the dierentiability of n0 and  yields the same property (w.r.t. x)
for n(x; t).
As a simple example, consider the case
(x; y) = q(y): (16)
If
a 
Z 1
0
q(y)dy > 0; (17)
we can nd the explicit form of the solution of (13)-(14)
n(x; t) =
N
a
q(x)

1  e at+ n0(x)e at: (18)
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We note that more general models can be studied with little additional work.
For instance  may be allowed to depend on t as well, or even on the total
wealth that, in the present case, is given by
W (t) =
Z 1
0
p(x)n(x; t)dx (19)
with p(x) monotonically increasing.
The dependence on age a (which could be crucial when economic dynamics
is coupled with criminology, see [12]) could also be included in the balance
equation. But in that case additional complication is introduced for the pres-
ence of boundary condition on a = 0, in particular when this condition is given
in terms of the fertility of the population.
3.2 Stationary solutions
For the sake of simplicity we will deal with the special case in which n0(x) 2
C[0; 1] and (x; y) 2 C  [0; 1]2, and we will exclude the trivial case   0.
Dene
g(x) =
Z 1
0
(x; y)dy; h(x) =
Z 1
0
(y; x)dy: (20)
We can prove ([9]) that, if g(x) > 0 in [0; 1], then (13) admits a constant
stationary solution
n1(x) = N; x 2 [0; 1]; (21)
if and only if
g(x) = h(x); x 2 [0; 1]: (22)
As an example, consider the particular case
(x; y) = p(x)q(y); p(x) > 0; q(y)  0: (23)
Then (13) has the stationary solution
n1(x) = N
q(x)
p(x)
Z 1
0
q(z)
p(z)
dz
 1
: (24)
In particular the stationary solution is constant if and only if
q(x) = Ap(x); (25)
for any positive constant A.
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3.3 Inequality index
It is well known that, since the classical paper [18], several indexes have
been proposed to characterize the economic inequality in a society, see the
celebrated Gini's paper [13] and the references in [17]. We propose here an
index that is simply related to the average wealth. Set in (19)
p(x) = x; (26)
(a choice which is reasonable and in any case does not imply a loss of generality
since p(x) is monotonically increasing with x) and dene the average per capita
wealth as
W^ (t) = N 1
Z 1
0
xn(x; t)dx: (27)
We dene the inequality index
i(t) =
1
NW^ (t)

1  W^ (t)
 Z 1
0

x  W^ (t)
2
n(x; t)dx; (28)
whence we have immediately
0  i  1: (29)
We note that for a population in which all the members have the same wealth
(necessarily W^ ; from now on we do not indicate time dependence explicitly,
to simplify notation) we would have n(x) = N(x  W^ ), where  is the Dirac
distribution. In this case i = 0.
On the contrary, for the same total wealth NW^ the most unequal distri-
bution corresponds to the case in which NW^ individuals have wealth index 1
and N(1  W^ ) have wealth index 0. This corresponds to
n(x) = 2(1  W^ )(x) + 2NW^(x  1); (30)
(the factor 2 is is introduced since
R 1
0 (x)dx =
R 1
0 (x   1)dx = 1=2). Hence,
in this case,
i =
1
W^ (1  W^ )
h
(1  W^ )W^ 2 + W^ (1  W^ )2
i
= 1: (31)
To see, on some other examples, how index i depends on the distribution
function n(x), we consider the case
n(x) = Nxa(1  x)b; (32)
where a; b 2 N and where  is a normalization constant such that R 10 n(x)dx =
N . After some lengthy algebra we get
i =
1
a+ b+ 3
: (33)
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3.4 Some numerical simulations
We give here some mathematical example taken from paper [9].
Let us take the mobility function
(x; y) = (x)(jx  yj)H(x  y) + (x)(jx  yj)H(y   x) (34)
where
 H is the Heaviside function,
 (x) = (1  x),
 (x) = x,
 (z) = e z2=22 (with  = 0:3, z = jx  yj) is a function modulating the
kernel with the distance between x and y.
Let us take four dierent initial conditions (with the same initial population
N = 1=6)
n1(x) =
1
3s
p
2
e x
2=2s2 ; s = 0:2; (35)
n2(x) =
1
6s
p
2
e (x 0:5)
2=2s2 ; s = 0:2; (36)
n3(x) =
8<:
 a(x  x0)=x0; 0 < x  x0;
b(x  (1  x0))=x0; (1  x0)  x  1;
0; elsewhere;
(37)
with x0 = 1=8; a = 2; b = (1=3  ax0)=x0;
n4(x) =
1
6
(1 + sin(4x)) ; (38)
and compute n(x; t). We use a nite dierence scheme, with an explicit for-
ward method in time. The integrals appearing in the equations are solved
by the trapezoidal rule integration method. The computation shows that the
equilibrium solution corresponding to the four initial conditions coincide (Fig.
6). On the other hand, the evolution of i(t) is obviously dierent (Fig. 2).
As we did in [9], we now consider an inverse problem for the integro-
dierential equation (13) i.e. we look for a function ~(x; y) such that (13)
admits a given stationary solution ~n(x). Of course, we do not expect that such
problem is uniquely solvable (in any case ~ is dened up to a multiplicative
constant). This is clearly shown noting that given ~n(x)  0, for any
~(x; y) = p(x)p(y)~n(y); (39)
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(A)
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
 
Initial condition n1(x)
Initial condition n2(x)
Equilibrium solution 
(B)
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
 
Initial condition n4(x)
Equilibrium solution
Initial condition n3(x)
Figure 1: Reaching the equilibrium solution from dierent initial data. The
equilibrium solution (solid line) is the same in all cases, which have been split
in two gures only for the reader convenience. (A): Initial conditions (35) and
(36). (B): Initial conditions (37) and (38).
5 10 15 20 25
Time (dimensionless)
 
Initial condition n1(x)
Initial condition n2(x)
Initial condition n3(x)
Initial condition n4(x)
Figure 2: Inequality index computed using the mobility function (34) and initial
conditions (35), (36), (37) and (38).
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where p(x) is an arbitrary positive function, equation (13) has the time-independent
solution ~n(x).
For a numerical check, let us take n3(x) (see (37)) to play the role of target
equilibrium solution and prove that taking
~(x; y) = p(x)p(y)n3(y) (40)
for any positive p(x), problem (P) has the asymptotic solution n3(x), for any
initial datum. Fig. 7 and 8 verify this fact, taking n(x; 0) = n4(x) as initial
condition and taking two dierent functions p(x).
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
 
t = 0
t = 15
t = 200 (final)
Target solution
Figure 3: An example of result stated in (39), with n(x; 0) = n4(x) and p(x) =
x+ 0:1.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
 
t = 0
t = 0.4
t = 4 (final)
Target solution
Figure 4: An example of result stated in (39), with n(x; 0) = n4(x) and p(x) =
1:5 + sin(2x).
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3.5 A PDE approach
Consider the second integral in (13) and expand n(x; t) assuming that n is
a smooth function:
n(y; t) = n(x; t) + nx(y; t)(y   x) + nxx(y; t)(y   x)
2
2
+ ::: (41)
Since it is reasonable to think that  has support in a suciently \small" strip
centered around the diagonal of the square (0; 1) (0; 1), we approximate (13)
by
@n(x; t)
@t
= C(x)n(x; t) +B(x)nx(x; t) +D(x; t)nxx(x; t); (42)
with
C(x) =
Z 1
0
[(y; x)  (x; y)] dy; (43)
B(x) =
Z 1
0
(y   x)(y; x)dy; (44)
D(x) =
Z 1
0
(y   x)2
2
(y; x)dy: (45)
Because of our assumptions on the support of  the integrals in (43),(44),
(45) may be computed over the interval ([x   ]+;max(1; x + )): It is imme-
diately seen that (42) can be written in a divergence form
nt =
 
D(x)nx +
 
B(x) D0(x)n
x
+
 
D00(x) B0(x) + C(x)n: (46)
Here we provide a simple numerical example, assuming
(x; y) =
8><>: 0:3 exp
"
 

y   0:5
22
2#
; if jx  yj < ;
0; otherwise:
(47)
with  = 0:1. Then (46) is a uniformly parabolic equation and if we impose as
boundary condition
D(x)nx +
 
B(x) D0(x)n = 0; on x = 0 and x = 1;
then the quantity
R 1
0 n(x; t)dx is conserved up to O() for any xed time t.
Assuming the following initial condition
n0(x) = 0:7 exp
"
 

x  0:4

2#
+ 0:3 exp
"
x  0:6

2#
(48)
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with  = 0:03, we solved the integro-dierential equation (13) and the partial
dierential equation (42), both for t 2 [0; T ], with T = 100. In Fig. 5 a
comparison of the two solutions evaluated at nal time is shown. The initial
condition is also displayed, in order to show the redistribution eect obtained
by imposing a transition function (x; y) centered in the middle wealth index
0:5. It is worthy to note that the global absolute dierence between solutions
(evaluated for any x 2 [0; 1], at any time) was computed as E = 0:1183 which is
in agreement with the error estimate in the Taylor approximation (41), namely
E  O(T3)  0:1
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
 
Initial condition
IDE
PDE
Figure 5: Comparison between solution of (13), integro-dierential equation
(IDE) and (42), partial dierential equation (PDE), at nal time T = 100.
The initial condition (48) is also displayed..
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4 Mathematical criminology
The use of mathematical models in criminology does not have a large and
rich tradition. Nevertheless, these topics attract a growing attention (see e.g.
the special volume of EJAM [3] where a great deal of references can be found
[14] and some recent workshops [1, 2]).
Essentially, we can generally say that a problem in criminology consists of
(a) An observable: the number of crimes (of a specic type) as a function of
time and position.
(b) The state variables that one wants to take into account, e.g.
{ age and income distribution
{ mobility
{ school, housing, social and urban segregation
{ topology of targets
{ crime patterns, crime organization
(c) The control functions as for instance
{ police forces and strategy
{ social control
{ law enforcement (severity of punishment)
{ social policy, welfare, school policy.
Although mathematical models might be unable to make quantitative predic-
tions (e.g. number of burglaries that will happen in a given urban domain
over next month), they can suggest the qualitative behaviour of a given so-
cial system and simulate how the outcomes change when control functions are
changed.
Thus, they can be used to plan strategies to contrast criminology and to
employ suitable resources in an optimal way.
Moreover, they are instrumental in the use and interpretation of the enor-
mous amount of data that are stored in the archives.
Roughly speaking, one could identify three main branches of mathematical
criminology, according to the class of methods and models used:
(i) models based on game theory
(ii) models based on population dynamics
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(iii) agent-based models.
We shall mostly concentrate on population dynamics and will nally deal with
a special class of models that can be included in the third category, i.e. models
based on cellular automata.
4.1 Criminology and population dynamics: \ecological" mod-
els
This class of models, in its dierent variants, is basically a predator-prey
system. In the simplest case, one has three sub-populations: the targets T , the
criminals C, and the guards G. Of course, T are preys for C, that in turn are
\predated" by G. In some cases G could also be considered predators w.r.t. T
since the latter sub-population bears the costs of maintaining the guards.
The main mathematical information that can be drawn from these models
concerns the study of the equilibrium points and their character (stability,
attractivity and relevant domain, etc.)
A specic case was considered in a paper by Vargo [24]. Here, just C and
G were considered and in the system
_C = aC   bCG+A
_G =  C + CG+B (49)
A and B represent the inuence of external \world" on the two populations.
A more complex model with three sub-populations is considered in [20].
Basically, the system is8<:
_T = r(N   T )(k   T )  TC   G
_C = fTC   CG  C
_G = gTC   hCG mG
(50)
In (50) the number of crimes (proportional to the product TC) determines the
increase of the number of guards, but also the recruitment of new criminals.
The system (50) is particularly rich, in particular when the terms account-
ing for the eect of predation are substituted by functions of Hollig's type. But
also when T is assumed to be constant interesting bifurcation behaviours are
observed as a function of parameter  representing the eciency of security
forces.
The paper [4] considers the interactions between the population of drug
smugglers b and drug producers n. The interaction between the two sub-
populations is symbiotic and the corresponding dynamical system is
_b =  h1b+ k1( B   b)n
_n =  h2n+ k2( N   n)b (51)
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where B and N are the total number of potential smugglers and producers,
respectively.
4.2 Criminology and population dynamics: \epidemiological
models"
In this class of models, the recruitment in the sub-population of criminals
is supposed to occur by a sort of \contagion" of a part of the population by
the criminals.
For instance, in the paper [23] the following system is considered
8>><>>:
_N =  N + S + (A+BN)C + P +2P
_S = N   S   S   SC + P
_C = S + SC   (A+BN)C   1C + (1 )2P
_P = 1C   2P
(52)
Here the class P of prisoners is introduced and the non-criminals are divided
in two sub-classes: S are susceptible to the contagion and may be recruited by
criminals C, whileN are non-susceptible. No \predation" terms are considered.
It can be noted that a \contagion" is also acting between N and C: the
presence of N induces a fraction of C to \redeem". Among the most question-
able weaknesses of the model we can quote:
(i) the fact that no input is considered from C to S nor from P to S.
(ii) the fact that \deterrence" on S from becoming criminals is determined by
the number of prisoners. As a consequence, we remark that (52) formally
does not preserve the positivity of the solutions.
But it can be noticed that the report quoted above contains a careful cali-
bration of the parameters based on well-structured historical data. The anal-
ysis of equilibrium points allows the authors to simulate dierent scenarios
corresponding to dierent policies, i.e. to dierent set up of parameters. We
can also note that the population of guards is not specically considered, but
that it could be included by mixing the two types of models.
It is clear that models of this class can also take some \social" factors
into account . For instance, in the scheme considered in [26] a population of
(temporarily)\recovered" is introduced whose inputs come from the susceptible
class (or the \poor" in the spirit of the paper) and from released from jail. The
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system is: 8>>>>><>>>>>:
_N =  T   ( + )N
_S = N   SC   S   S
_C = SC + BRC   C   C
_P = C   P   P
_R = S + P   BRC   R
(53)
In (53)  < 1 is the reduction of the eciency of contagion due to experience
of jail, T is the total dimension of the population. The latter is assumed to be
constant so that if  is the death rate of each sub-population, the aggregate
birth rate is also  (and all individuals are supposed to born in the class N , a
fact that is rather questionable).
4.3 Criminology and mathematical models: a more complex
scheme
A general model taking into account the socio-economic dynamics discussed
in Sec. 2 and the dynamics of recruitment, arrest, etc. of criminals will be
composed of n + 3 populations, where n is the number of classes. Besides of
coecients j and j of social promotion and relegation of each social classes,
one has to prescribe the following rates:
 recruitment rate of criminals Rj (in principle from each social class);
 crime rate Kj (in principle aecting each class);
 arrest rate A;
 \spontaneous" decay D of criminals;
 release rate Fj of prisoners (in principle entering each class);
 hiring rate Hj of guards;
 \induced" decay of guards L;
 \spontaneous" decay of guards D.
Just to simplify a bit we assume that criminals are recruited in the poorest
class and write3
3The bilinear terms juj(t)C(t) andmC(t)G(t) can be substituted by terms in the Hollig's
form, jujC=(li + ui) and mCG=(l + C).
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R = ku1(t)C(t)
Kj = juj(t)C(t); K(t) =
P
jKj
A = mC(t)G(t)
D =  C(t)  C2(t); taking into account some intra-specic competition
F =  P (t)
H =
P
j Hj = hK(t)
L =  A
D =  qG(t):
(54)
If one thinks that some of the parameters listed above may depend on the
actual wealth of the society (that is in turn depending on the uj(t)), it is clearly
understood that the task of getting quantitative information from the model in
real situations is hopeless, and maybe meaningless because of the huge number
of parameters to be calibrated.
In any case, from the theoretical point of view, the well-posedness of the
complete model can be proved, as well as the positivity of all the unknown
functions.
In the sequel we present a concrete example that shows that some qualita-
tive information can be obtained.
Assume n = 2 (two social classes: the poor and the rich individuals).
Moreover we take the police size as a given constant and we disregard the
population in jail. This means that our analysis is done on an intermediate
scale between the average time in jail and the time required to change the
policy of hiring police forces. Thus the model is the following8<:
_u1 =  u1 + u2   ku1C + C + C2 +mCG=(l + C)
_u2 = u1   u2
_C = ku1C   C + C2  mCG=(l + C)
(55)
We also assume that k depends on the total wealth W (t) whose dynamics is
expressed by
_W (t) = a1u1 + a2u2   W   (W ) u2C
l2 + u2
  g(W )G: (56)
Here  accounts for the budget policy of the community,  measures the neg-
ative eect on the wealth due to the crimes (committed only against the rich
people) and G is the (given) number of guards while g is the rate of expenditure
for their maintenance. To be specic, we suppose that both  and g depend
linearly on W and discuss the equilibria and their stability in terms of k and
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G. Consider in particular the criminal-free equilibrium C = 0. The stability
of this equilibrium is ensured if and only if
ak   b  cG  dG2 < 0; (57)
where a; b; c; d are positive numbers that can be calculated from the parameters
of the system. Thus, if k exceeds a critical value depending quadratically on
G, a new equilibrium state exists with non-vanishing population of criminals.
The model can also be used to discuss the budgetary policy of the society.
For this reason we disaggregate in (56) the expressions that are devoted to
social promotion, writing
 = s+ ^; (58)
so that sW is the rate of \social" expenditures whose eect is modelled assum-
ing that  (i.e. the coecient of social promotion) is increasing with sW .
Summing up (s + gG)W is the rate of the expenditures devoted to ght
criminality (\how much") whereas the factor s or the ratio gG=s indicates
\how" the society decides to split this expenditure between repression of the
crime and social promotion.
Using the model above, it is possible to see if this choice can be optimized
(maximization of wealth, minimization of criminality, etc.) over a given time
horizon. Of course, an appropriate cost function has to be dened and mini-
mized.
5 A model based on cellular automata
We consider a particular kind of crime i.e. tax evasion.
Let us study the abstract situation in which an individual (i.e. a cell in
the 2D cellular automaton) can be either in the state X (tax-payer) or Y (tax-
evader) and that the transition from one state to another is inuenced by the
state of its neighbours and by a global eld.
5.1 No law enforcement
We assume ([19]) that the population occupies every cell of a square grid
of side n, so that the total dimension of the population is N = n  n. In
our case, all the simulations have been performed with n = 40. We dene the
probability of changing the current state as sum of these two contributions (see
[7], [6]):
P TOT = PLOC + PGLO (59)
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where PLOC and PGLO are the local and global probabilities of changing the
state. Obviously, the probability of remaining in the same state is given by
1  P TOT .
Let us rst dene the local probabilities. The local probability that a tax-
payer becomes a cheater in the next time step is given by:
PLOCX!Y = l
NLY
NL
; 0 < l < 1 (60)
where NLY is the number of cheaters in the neighborhood of this cell formed by
NL cells (so,
NLY
NL
is the fraction of cheaters in its neighborhood). In the same
way we can dene the local probability that a cheater becomes a tax-payer as
PLOCY!X = k
NL  NLY
NL
; 0 < m < 1: (61)
Obviously, NL NLY corresponds to the number of taxpayers in the neighbor-
hood.
Next, we dene the global probability for a tax payer to become a cheater
as
PNONLOCX!Y = ; 0 <  < 1 (62)
and, similarly, the global probability for a cheater to become a tax payer as
PNONLOCY!X = ; 0 <  < 1: (63)
We use a synchronous or parallel updating rule where all the system sites
are updated at the same time step (in contrast to asynchronous or sequential
updating where only one randomly selected site is update at each time) [11, 25].
We assume reection boundary conditions on the sides of the square. The
model is then completed by dening the neighborhood of each cell as a square
centered in the cell and formed by m  m cells excluding the cell itself (the
so-called Moore neighborhood [15]). In the sequel, we will specify the value of
m.
In the spirit of classical population dynamics [5], we write an ODE express-
ing the balance in terms of inow and outow. Thus, we write:
d Y
dt
= _Y =  (N   Y )   Y + l

N
Y (N   Y )  k

N
(N   Y )Y (64)
where the coecients in the contagion terms are written as l

N and
k
N for
normalization purposes and ; ; l; k  0.
Normalizing and dening the new parameter:
d = l   k (65)
Advances in Industrial and Applied Mathematics 43
we have to solve the following Initial Value Problem:
_y(t) =  (1  y)   y + d y (1  y)
y(0) = y0
(66)
An explicit expression of the solution of the Initial Value Problem (66) for
the case d > 0 can be found and its asymptotic value is given by the branch
between 0 and 1 of the following expressions:
y =
d  ( + )p( + )2 + 2 d(   ) + d2
2 d
(67)
Clearly, if we assume that NL is the entire square or, equivalently, that
m = n, the CA is a probabilistic approach to the nite dierence approximation
of equation (66).
Figure 6: Time evolution of the cheater population y of the ODE and CA
with maximum neighborhood (NL = 1599). The parameter setup is 0 = 0:01
0 = 0:008, l0 = 0:31 k0 = 0:30. The initial condition is y0 = 0:1. The CA
curve is an average over 10 simulations.
In Figure 6 we display the solution of (66) with y0 = 0:1 and the values
of yk =
Yk
N , where Yk is the total number of cells occupied by cheaters at the
kth-step, of a simulation on a CA with NL = 1599.
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5.2 Introducing scal policy
For simplicity we assume that the total rate of scal revenue of the society
is proportional to the number of tax payers. Moreover, it is assumed that the
total rate of expenditure is proportional to the actual value of W . Thus, the
time evolution of the total wealth is given by:
_W = a (N   Y )  W (68)
where a and  are non negative. Correspondingly, for the CA model, we dene
a normalized wealth at each time step k:
wk = wk 1 + 1  yk 1    wk 1 (69)
Next we assume that the coecients  , , k and l may depend on the
policy the society is adopting to contrast tax evasion. More specically, we
assume that the policy of the society in controlling tax evasion is characterized
in terms of the fraction  ' of the budget devoted to this goal per unit time.
(i) It is reasonable to assume that  and k are increasing functions of the
amount of resources the society allocates to ght tax evasion. Therefore, we
assume
 = 0 (2  e p'w) (70)
and
k = k0 (2  e p'w) (71)
where 'w accounts for the expenses devoted to prevent tax evasion and p > 0
is a sensitivity parameter to be adjusted to experimental data.
(ii) Coecient  and l on the contrary, should decrease with the intensity
of the contrast to parasitism. We set
 = 0 (1 + e
 p'w) (72)
and
l = l0 (1 + e
 p'w): (73)
In Figure 7 we show the dependence on ' of the asymptotic values of w and
of y.
One could ask which is the optimal value of ' according to this model. We
give here a simple criterion: we prescribe a time horizon T (i.e. a number 
of time steps) over which we want to design our policy and give as the initial
values the values y0; w0 corresponding to the \anarchic" state of the society
(i.e. ' = 0). Then, we compute the time evolution of y and w for increasing
values of '. Denoting by y(') and w(') the values at step , the \gain" will
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Figure 7: Asymptotic values of y (A) and w (B) obtained from the CA model
for dierent values of '. The parameter setup is 0 = 0:01 0 = 0:008 l0 = 0:31
m0 = 0:30 and p = 5 and NL = 120. The asymptotic value is evaluated as an
average over 1000 time steps (after a transient period of 1000 steps) and over
10 simulations.
be G(') = w(')  w0. To obtain this gain, the society has spent and amount
E() =
Pn 1
j=1 wj . In Figure 8 we display the dierence G(')   E(') for
increasing values of '. The simulation shows that there is a value '1 of ' for
which this dierence is maximum and a value, '2, beyond which increasing
investment in ghting cheaters is no longer convenient (since the dierence
becomes negative).
46 Vietnam Journal of Mathematical Applications, Vol. 12, N. 2, 2014
Figure 8: Dierence between the gain and the expenditure over a time horizon
of ve years (T = 50). As it can be seen, '1  0:002 and '2  0:005. The same
parameter setup as before is used: 0 = 0:01 0 = 0:008 l0 = 0:31 m0 = 0:30.
Moreover, p = 5 and Nl = 120
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